Dynamics of Transgenerational Memory

Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina is still marked by war traumas. Prevailing ethno-national policies keep citizens in fear, under constant threat of a new war – for their own interests. Politics has instrumentalized trauma.

How – and whether – generations from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the regions that lived through the wars in the former Yugoslavia, especially the events of 1995, and the generation born that same year have shaped mutual understanding of the past? To what extent are their views aligned today – and how do they differ?

"Everyone was trying to make their own, national memory. In Croatia, it is specific because it is a combination of victor and victim, which gives enormous strength to the memory of the Homeland War, which is still too often at the heart of politics. In Serbia, the combination of defeat and victimhood, which strengthens the need for rematch, attempts to change the result of the war after 30 years. Bosnia and Herzegovina is blocked, both by its own divisions, and by the undiminished ambitions of Serbia and Croatia. Montenegro is in agony between pro-Serb and pro-Montenegrin forces. Macedonia is constantly trapped by its neighbours. The wars of the 1990s are still going on. So is the hypnosis of societies, which were then made up of ruling elites. It is enough to see that in almost all countries in power are those who fought wars to understand how they are kept in power by the constant maintenance of the 1990s."

"In Bosnia and Herzegovina, war is not a thing of the past – it is the currency of the present. Ethnational elites live on fear, feed on trauma and throw a new narrative about the 'threat to come' to the people every few months – if not with a tank, then at least with a statement. And all this would not be possible if trauma was not institutionalized. In our country, it is not treated – it is exposed, monetized, recycled and used as connective tissue for a divided society. Generations that lived through the wars of the 1990s, especially in 1995 – the one in which the genocide in Srebrenica was committed, but also ended the war – carry an experience that is not a theory."

"In my experience on the field, in front of and behind the camera, I have often met those who do not want to remember anymore, because it brings them back to pain. On the other hand, the young people I meet want to know. They want to understand what happened and how it can never happen again. And this is where the connection between generations is born, perhaps not always through words, but through presence, through the will to look the truth in the eye. But this dynamic is not simple. We still live in a society where politics uses the past for its own benefit. Where trauma is not treated, but instrumentalized."

"Remembrance policies are created in the public space. What and how a particular society remembers and which value system is represented by that same society. I will mention Prijedor again, where a memorial with the names of Republika Srpska fighters in the very centre of the city performs two functions. It symbolically erases the identity of those who were systematically tortured and killed in this city precisely as part of the systemic policy of the Republika Srpska. These names also serve to forget the genesis of the war in BiH and relativize the position of those who implemented their policy of ethnic cleansing in an imbalance of power. I believe that there is nothing to be found about this in the history textbooks in the Republika Srpska."

"Large and radical differences regarding all that the wartime past gave, where they arose both during and after the war, were created for the public, mostly, programmatically and targeted under the influence of policies and official institutions in most often different national environments, more or less 'cleaned up' by current policies."

"As for those of us who survived the war, the picture is equally complex. Some of us still live with the trauma and preserve the memory of what happened; others remain trapped in denial, or are simply exhausted and apathetic. For us, for the generation that survived the war, it is already too late. It is too late to make some common sense out of the past that would encourage regional change for the better. The younger generations have that energy, how they will use it, we'll see."

"Fear, based on past experiences, is potentiated by political discourse on the one hand, but also by numerous subjective fears that characterize modern generations of people. Fear of the precariat, uncertain individual and social future, lack of trust in social institutions are factors that complicate all life interactions and relationships, and are also realities that political discourse instrumentalizes with unbearable ease."

"Surviving parents convey memories through personal stories, and children transform them into active memory through learning, activism, and a culture of remembrance. Where there is open dialogue, an awareness of the importance of truth and peace is built together. However, differences are often noticeable. The elderly can remain attached to their own pain and divisions, while the younger are more likely to break the cycle of hatred and build new bridges, seeking common ground beyond nationalist narratives. Many young people feel frustrated by the fact that they live in a system that constantly produces fear and insecurity for political ends."

"Due to frequent conflicts and political bickering, two camps have been made in these generations. One consists of those who have become vigorous advocates of narratives who have taken over from their parents and society and who continue to heat up conflicts, while the other includes those who are fed up with all these stories from all three sides and do not want to participate in it, but have focused on the present and are looking to live life better with everything it provides, from travel, learning, socializing."

“Somewhere, this younger generation hears about the war firsthand and thus develops a certain mutual understanding. However, it seems to me that silence or selective storytelling is more common, which leaves gaps and misunderstandings between generations, either due to the trauma of the elderly who cannot speak, or due to the lack of interest of the younger generation in the 'ancient' past.”

"There is no unique memory. There are only fragments: ethno-national, personal, academic, alternative, and if you want, media. Those who survived in 1995 remember through pain, while those born in the same year remember through written traces. However, both generations are hostages to the same policies that make trauma a prey."

"The fears encountered every day, except perhaps in the generations of the third age, are far more existential and this extends from those in their early twenties to those before retirement. As far as wars are concerned, extremism seems more present among these younger ones."

"In societies bearing the burden of unprocessed or semi-processed post-conflict trauma that spans several generations, the importance of the process (for) writing and archiving in a broader sense cannot be emphasized sufficiently. Post-war tensions between the whole as truth and fragmentary truths, between personal and factual and legal-political and then ideological-political (regime-related), tensions between the Dayton ceasefire and real life 30 years later, between conquering ideologies and denial of the then and now and factual truth about crimes, tensions between new-old conquering momentum and propaganda and political responsibility for the aggression against Bosnia – are simply intolerable, to say the least."

"The politics of the past and the politics of history are actually located in the context of the theory of cultural hegemony. The politics of history (which is actually placed in the political realm - where different actors not only try to use history for specific interests but also for concrete political gain, and which is related to political memory) is a process that reveals forces and contradictions that fight for the hegemony of discourse and interpretative models."

"I think that there is no harmonization of views on anything, including the common past and the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. The proof is also in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the attitudes and opinions of generations born and raised in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian entity Republika Srpska are drastically different from those in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was influenced by family and personal memories, experiences and interpretations, as well as continuous media poisoning and deceiving the public through the performances of the political and social elite and the media."

"The wars of the 1990s were marked by another process, which is the process of transition, the transformation of society. The fact is that Bosnia and Herzegovina was attacked by two nationalist projects created by neighbouring countries: Serbia and Croatia, but also, through the war, a political and social change of society took place. We remembered differently in socialism, because when we talked about the past, we tried to build a new society, to be oriented towards the future. Today we live in a sensationalist capitalism, which is based on instant memory, forcing us to focus on the consumerist moment. This consumerist consciousness is intertwined with the nationalist imagination."

“I would like to focus on the situation in Serbia…The older generation of those who rose up against nationalists, war and murderers is permanently marked by the experience of war, and tries to explain to themselves how and why this happened, why so much mass frenzy about enthusiasm for hatred, chauvinism and fratricide. It's a life-long task that never ends. Conscious younger generations feel this burden, which they inherited from the elderly, but even when they are aware of the violent, villainous past of their own country – most often they try to lift this burden off their shoulders in some easy and simple way (which does not exist).”

"Over the decades, societies have been transformed due to these causes within the borders of states, and the media and social networks have taken on a dominant influence. Technology is developing and offering attractions that bury the facts of the past. The differences are great and are determined by the dynamics of policies and politicians in power and in opposition."

"I would say that only through the activities of civil society do transgenerational meetings and exchanges take place that aim precisely at mutual understanding of the past and transgenerational healing. I think that intergenerational meetings under the auspices of the state (lectures, commemorations, events) serve exclusively to build an identity that would be suitable for further manipulation and potential war."

"In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are three versions of collective memory that are opposed. Three experiences of one event. Proliferated and ardent nationalism makes it impossible to confront one's own past, and as long as one society does not confront one's own past, there are no fundamental prerequisites for progress."

"Generations of adults and those who were born at the time of the Srebrenica genocide, in Serbia, are not significantly different. For most of them - silence is common. The elderly are silent, because they know what they "need" to keep quiet about in order to maintain the apparent social peace. Most of those born in 1995 are silent and indifferent. It does not matter to them that genocide was committed at that time. Society's reaction, as if agreed: something bad happened in Srebrenica, but what do we have to do with it?"

"The older generation, whose lives were truly marked by the war and who strongly shaped their own memories of it, also has memories of the world before it and is basically based on it in terms of identity. This generation of 1995 has no memory of a time before, but it has no memory of war, and unfortunately no real experience of living with others. Unfortunately, this generation is more inclined to mythologize memories and uncritically support official cultures of memory than the generation that preceded it and is paradoxically more shaped by the trauma it did not experience."

"It is wrong to think that young people do not want to know. We're the ones not giving them a chance to familiarize themselves with that time. We created that reality – not them. And maybe we are afraid to be asked once: 'What did you do during the war? Have you done all you could to prevent evil, or at least to diminish it?'"