The Missing

"The failure to pass the April [2006] Package of constitutional reforms."

"Consistent and complete implementation of Annex 7 – Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, especially Article 1, Paragraph 2: "The Parties shall ensure that refugees and displaced persons are permitted to return in safety, without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution, or discrimination, particularly on account of their ethnic origin, religious belief, or political opinion.""

"The biggest missed opportunity was to build a civil state after Dayton. At the moment when the world powers could, they did not want to. When local politicians had to, they weren't allowed. If there had been a step towards the equality of citizens and not nations, today we would be talking about Europe and not entities. Between peace and justice, we chose stability - and remained unstable."

"The protests against unresponsive and predatory government in 2013 and 2014 created unique opportunities to build upon the democratic potential of the society, and to juxtapose this against the domination of the social sphere by entrenched political structures. This was a moment in which an opportunity existed to develop a legitimate constitution that would replace the (putatively) temporary one imposed at Dayton."

"From my biased perspective as someone very much interested in socioeconomic justice, a major missed opportunity of the Dayton process was the failure to incorporate restorative and socio-economic justice mechanisms that could have built a more inclusive community. While the agreement included the ICTY and limited provisions for refugee return (Annex 7), it lacked any reparatory measures for those most affected by the war. In parallel, by leaving education, welfare, and social policy to the entities, Dayton effectively precluded the development of a unified social contract and allowed political elites to distribute benefits along ethnic lines. This omission hindered community reconstruction particularly for ‘minority returnees’, victims but also veterans. The peace process thus remained focused on territorial and institutional engineering rather than human capital. A more holistic inclusion of socioeconomic justice and social reintegration could have transformed Dayton from a ceasefire agreement into a foundation for an inclusive peace."

"I'll give you two: one international, one domestic. INTERNATIONAL: Treating addressing education as "low politics," only programmatically. The prime beneficiaries of Dayton - BiH political elites - fiercely defend their ability to indoctrinate youth with ethnic perceptions. Had this been a greater focal point of external pressure, it would have allowed for more pronounced bottom-up pressure for systemic change. DOMESTIC: The absolute inertia from the commanding heights of allegedly "pro-BiH" parties to develop and propose genuinely integrative alternative social contracts and constitutional systems to replace Dayton, particularly with the European Court for Human Rights case law since Sejdic-Finci. One can only conclude that they like the perquisites of power under this system - and that their pursuit of a "civic state" is mere marketing for popular consumption. There are no visible (positive) change agents in the Dayton system; it constitutes a "peace cartel," in which established parties leverage fear and patronage to maintain control. BiH is an internal colony in the first instance - into which interested external actors can pursue interests through the local gatekeepers."

"Many believe that the failure to adopt the "April Package" in 2006 proposed by the US administration was a mistake."

"One missed opportunity during the implementation of the Agreement is the absence of a serious constitutional reform that could improve the functioning of the state. In the first post-war decade, there was somewhat more international political will and a stronger influence to create circumstances suitable for transforming the existing Dayton framework into a fairer and more efficient management system. However, that chance was not used. Attempts to correct the biggest shortcomings of the Dayton structure, such as limiting ethnic blockages in decision-making or ensuring greater equality of citizens vis-à-vis the constituent nations, remained unfinished. If there had been a broader agreement on a more modern constitutional arrangement, Bosnia and Herzegovina would have looked different today."

"The failure of the initiative to reform the Dayton Constitution from 2006, the so-called "April Package", is probably the biggest missed opportunity. If the BiH parliament had adopted this package on April 26, 2006, it certainly could have changed the post-war development of BiH. The reforms that were included in the "April Package" seemed cosmetic to many at the time, and even more drastic changes to the Dayton Constitution were demanded in the direction of further centralization of BiH. Today, these reforms seem like science fiction, which only indicates the extent to which the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has deteriorated in the last 20 years. However, despite the collapse of the "April Package" and multi-year political blockades, BiH remained a relatively stable country, and many reforms that transferred competences from the entity level to the state level proved to be unsuccessful. This shows us that BiH can survive and maybe even prosper as a decentralized state, and that the functionality and responsibility of actors in the political system is much more important for a country than its administrative arrangement."

"The April Package."

"After the collapse of the "April Package" and the reform of the BiH Constitution, we slipped into the fear of secession and lived a decade in tensions."

"Also, moderate leaders elected in 2000 had the opportunity to do meaningful reforms, but they squabbled and fought among themselves - resulting in no progress and the hard-line parties returning to power in 2002."

"One of the key missed opportunities was the failure to use the early post-war period for constitutional reform, which would have gradually transformed the ethnic model of governance into a more functional, civic framework. The failure of the so-called "April Package" of constitutional reforms from 2006, which could have strengthened state institutions, encouraged social integration and reduced dependence on international supervision and ethno-national elites, is especially highlighted as a missed opportunity."

"The 2001 election law was a missed opportunity to create a more accountable system and soften political divides enabled by ethnic cleansing and legitimized through Dayton. When discussions began, the OSCE and others received proposals for various systems. Some would have done much to enable cross-entity voting; utilize multi-preference ballots; weaken party control to empower individuals; and other steps to promote moderation. While such options were known, and while 2000/2001 was the time when the international community had the most potential to marginalize spoilers and support forward thinking options, the law adopted was one that incentivizes and rewards polarized and polarizing rhetoric; punishes moderation and independent thinking; and enables transactional coalition building that minimizes citizen voice and choice. I’ve never heard a satisfactory explanation on why “the west” gave their seal of approval to a system that works for the elites and nationalists, but does little for everyone else."