Dr. Jessie Barton Hronešová

HIGHLIGHTS:

Dayton is being blamed for everything

"A lot of Dayton is being kind of blamed for everything, from potholes to corrupt politicians. A lot of the time, it has been sometimes described as both a blessing and a curse."

Some positives coming out from Dayton

"I think we have also seen some surveys of Bosnian citizens across the board, not only Bosniaks, that, as time progresses, they have actually come to the conclusion that there are more positives coming out from Dayton than negatives, and I probably share that view."

Peace negotiations are imperfect

"All peace negotiations are flawed in one way or another. I really cannot think of a perfect peace that we would have ever achieved in any form. They are all imperfect, and they are all a matter of compromise. It's their inherent nature."

Dayton bashing and unrealistic expectations

"I do see quite a lot of the Dayton bashing if you like - a slightly unfair, using kind of unrealistic expectations. There have also been quite a few opportunities for domestic reform since Dayton, which had, so to speak, nothing to do with Dayton per se. But they have failed because of domestic brinkmanship and because of domestic interests rather than the peace negotiation as such. So, I think, maybe in 30 years, we will start looking at Dayton slightly differently… We should be asking more about what we should do with this. Why is it that Dayton, or the Constitution, has not been reformed and transformed?"

Dayton as a 'blueprint' may be a strong word

"I think a blueprint may be a strong word, but I think it is a way of doing diplomacy that didn't come out of nowhere. Dayton sometimes gets portrayed as this [21 days] negotiation, with people being locked down in a military base. It's sometimes very militarised, if you like, the whole discourse around it."

Constitutional structure perspective

"Dayton, as such to me, is not the issue per se. It's the constitutional structure. So, it's one part of Dayton, and I think we should be looking at it through that perspective. Obviously, there are other issues with some of the other agreements and other annexes of the Dayton Peace Agreement. But really, it's the Annex 4… It has these inherent tensions and problems in the constitutional structure that was created. "

Ideational predecessors to Dayton

"But Dayton didn't come out of nowhere. Dayton was based on a series of previous negotiations, previous discussions, and previous diplomacy. Part of which Holbrooke was part of and which Holbrooke wasn't. So, Dayton has already worked with quite a lot of the ground that was prepared and quite a lot of the proposals that were already kind of floating in the air. There was already a ceasefire negotiated. That was the Washington agreement. There were various plans that failed in the past, but although they failed, they were still used as an ideational basis, if you like for what Dayton ultimately turned out to be."

The level of 1995 international cooperation would be close to impossible today

"One of the biggest problems that we have today is that we have a non-cooperative member of the Security Council, which is something that we didn't have in 1995. So, in a way, one could argue that the timing was also fairly good for Richard Holbrooke to have the Contact Group that included Russia and to have Russia also, in a way, force Milosevic or speak to Milosevic to agree with some of these negotiations. Right now, when we have Russia engaged in a major or creating a major war conflict, I think that cooperation would be close to impossible, and I think that was a critical piece of the puzzle… For me, it would be the major obstacle to [2024] Dayton. So, I cannot say whether it would be negotiated or not because, ultimately, each negotiation is a matter of compromise. "

We must start including the Global South

"When we think about conflicts, be it in the Middle East or Ukraine and Russia. We have to start, including the global South, we have to start, including BRIC countries, minus obviously including Russia, in a way that maybe before we haven't necessarily done so because there was this peace hegemony, if you like, of Western actors in particular, NATO, European communities, the European Union, the United States, and so on, which have always come together as great powers in these various contact groups."

Who can act as a gatekeeper and who is able to negotiate

"When I look at the future of peace mediation, I start thinking about which other actors need to be included, who needs to be behind the table, and who is the one that can act as a gatekeeper - who can act as someone who is able to negotiate a compromise."

TRANSCRIPT:

• Please explain your connection and expertise with the Dayton Peace Accords.

"My name is Jessie Barton Hronešova. I work at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies as a lecturer in political sociology. And the connection to Dayton is long, I should say. It's been nearly 20 years that I have been working on politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia as such, and particularly focusing on issues regarding dealing with the past and transitional justice. Not only in my research. I've written various articles on these issues, but also as a practitioner. I worked at the ICTY, I worked for the OSCE and I worked for Balkan Investigative Reporting Networks based in Sarajevo and then in Belgrade. Through these various approaches, Dayton has always been a very important part of the context and the background of understanding not only how to conclude or how the conflict in and from Yugoslavia and in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina was concluded, but also to understand kind of the current structures and constitutional arrangements in Bosnia as such."

• Should we observe the Dayton Peace Accords as a continuum, whereby its positive and negative attributes change depending on the context? How do we reconcile this Success-Failure tension when discussing its future and legacy?

"You see Dayton being kind of blamed for everything from potholes to corrupt politicians a lot of the times. It has been sometimes described, as you're saying, both a blessing and a curse. But I think, you know, we've seen also some surveys of Bosnian citizens across the board, not only Bosniaks, that as time progresses have actually come to the conclusion that there are more positives coming out from Dayton than negatives. And I probably share that view and I hopefully will be able to outline why. I think number one is that Dayton as such, to me, is not the issue per se. It's the constitutional structure. So it's one part of Dayton. And I think we should be looking at it through that perspective. There are other issues, obviously, with some of the other agreements and some of the other annexes of the Dayton Peace Agreement as such. But really, it's the Annex IV, where the constitutional weaknesses that some people are often kind of associating as a direct synonym with Dayton, that seem to be the problem because they have some kind of inherent tensions. Is this an agreement about group rights or is this an agreement about individual rights? And there are some contradictions there which certainly could have been prevented probably with more time at hand and with more negotiations. And you know better than I that the negotiations in the room for that month when they were happening were extremely tense and difficult. I wouldn't want to be blaming anyone for some of these shortfallings. But I still believe that it's, from my perspective, I think we're all looking at it retrospectively, is that it achieved borderline the impossible. It kept a country that was torn apart through a brutal conflict. And potentially, it was trying to achieve the impossible to bring groups that were really locked in this fight, to bring them together in one functioning state. All peace negotiations are flawed in one way or another. I really cannot think of a perfect peace that we would have ever achieved in any form. They're all imperfect and they're all a matter of compromise. It's their inherent nature. I do see quite a lot of the Dayton bashing, if you like, as slightly unfair and also using unrealistic expectations. Because there have also been, since Dayton, quite a few opportunities for domestic reform, which had, so to speak, nothing to do with Dayton per se, with the negotiations in 1995 in Dayton. And they have failed because of domestic brinkmanship and because of domestic interests rather than the peace negotiation as such. I think, you know, maybe in the thirty years’ time we will start looking at Dayton slightly differently. It has these inherent tensions, it has these inherent problems in the constitutional structure that was created, which from my perspective is very much looking at identities as rigid and locking them in as a tripartite state, which from the start one could have argued is problematic. And I think Richard Holbrooke actually saw it himself as problematic as well. But that's what happened ultimately. It was the result of these tense negotiations. I think we should be more asking about, so what do we do with this? And why is it that Dayton has not, or the constitution I said, why is it that it has not been reformed and transformed? So I think that would be my way of looking at it, to move beyond the Dayton bashing and using it as a very easy scapegoat."

• How can we observe the Dayton Negotiations Model: as a legacy of skilful diplomacy that ended a war and kept peace for 29 years or as a blueprint for future conflict resolution?

"So I don't feel more aligned with either, if I'm honest with you. I think the, as you say, skilful diplomacy is a huge part of how people that actually, I think especially the diplomatic corps, remember Dayton because it was very masterful. I think there were various aspects of it in terms of how Richard Holbrooke negotiated with three parties, the conditions he set before they came to Dayton, the fact that the Bosnian Serb and the Bosnian Croat parties were kind of kept in the dark to make sure that they don't intervene and interfere in the negotiations, how Richard Holbrooke had to negotiate the domestic US politics as well. There were so many aspects of it that were masterful. And I'm sure we still do have diplomats of his caliber, if you like, that are still hopefully somewhere working behind closed doors. But equally, I think a blueprint may be a strong word, but I think it is a way of doing diplomacy that didn't come out of nowhere. I think, again, going back to what I was saying, Dayton sometimes gets portrayed as this 30-day negotiation or 20-whatever days it was, one-month negotiation, people being locked down in a military base. It's sometimes very militarized, if you like, the whole discourse around it. But Dayton didn't come out of nowhere. Dayton was based on a series of previous negotiations, previous discussions, previous diplomacy, part of which Holbrook was, part of which Holbrook wasn't. Dayton has already worked with quite a lot of the ground that was prepared and quite a lot of the proposals that were already kind of floating in the air. There was already ceasefire negotiated. That was the Washington Agreement. There were various plans that failed in the past, but although they failed, they still were used as an ideational basis, if you like, for what Dayton ultimately turned out to be. I think it's more of a model of working where I think it would be naive to think of bringing in warring parties and locking them into a military base without any of that context, any of the ground that was prepared before then. I think skilful diplomacy, I would bring those two together. On the one hand, the legacy of skilful diplomacy, but a blueprint of working in a conflict. And so I think if we look at current conflicts, I really hope, and I think there are some signs that there is some negotiation behind closed doors. There are some plans being prepared because if they're not, then I think it will take a lot longer than just a month to negotiate a peace deal in the way that it's sometimes portrayed that it was done in Bosnia."

• If we look at current global affairs, do you think the international consensus to end a war is weaker today than in 1995? Would the Dayton Peace Accords be successfully negotiated and signed today?

"It's an impossible question of virtual history, of course. But I would say one of the biggest problems that we have today is that we have a non-cooperative member of the Security Council, which is something that we didn't have in 1995. In a way, one could argue that the timing was also fairly good for Richard Holbrooke to have the contact group that included Russia and to have Russia also in a way force Milosevic or speak to Milosevic to agree with some of these negotiations. Right now, I think obviously when we have Russia engaged in a major or creating a major war conflict, a major war, I think that cooperation, it would be close to impossible. And I think that really was a critical piece of the puzzle. I think that I would see that as the main issue. There's a realm of other issues that you're talking about. Some people would talk about the downfall of the liberal order or the crisis of the world liberal order and so on and so on. And the lack of legitimacy of institutions like the United Nations and the United States as such, right? Like I think the legitimacy of the United States and the credibility of Richard Holbrooke as a diplomat, but also as a representative of the United States did play a big role. All of these things are different as well. But from my perspective, I really would fear that the Russian non-cooperation on this, which I'm fairly sure would not be coming today, to me would be the major obstacle of Dayton. I cannot say whether it would be negotiated or not, because ultimately each negotiation is a matter of compromise. Sometimes it's a tit-for-tat, sometimes it's a we promise you this, we lift sanctions, and so on. But from my perspective, I see that very difficult. And I think that is potentially your next question about, you know, where do we go from here? With the current conflict, I see that as one of the major obstacles today. Especially regarding what is the role of the UN in any peace negotiations."

Finally, what do you see as the key challenges for the future of conflict mediation?

"The one thing that I keep thinking about is agency and where is agency in conflict mediation and where is legitimacy? And I think what we increasingly see is that legitimacy is getting diluted. It's getting decentralized and that has a knock-on effect on agency. I think any future conflict mediation will start including actors that have not been so far part of conflict mediations. And you can see that as a problem. You can see that as a positive. So I think, when we think about conflicts, be it in the Middle East or Ukraine and Russia, we have to start including the Global South, we have to start including the BRIC countries, obviously including Russia, in a way that maybe before we haven't necessarily done so, because there was this peace hegemony, if you like, of Western actors in particular, NATO, European communities, the European Union, the United States, and so on which have always come together as great powers in these various contact groups that were created. With the caveat of the Peace Implementation Council that was created for Bosnia and Herzegovina, that included a wider range of actors, but still was predominantly centered on the Western actors. When I look at the future of peace mediation, I start thinking really about which other actors need to be included, who needs to be behind the table, and who is the one that actually can act as a gatekeeper, who can act as someone, you know, who actually is able to negotiate compromise. I don't have specific answers, but I have some thoughts about how that might pan out regarding, you know, some of the ongoing conflicts that we see today."